• In the late summer of 1948, a small group of influential conservative voices gathered secretly to form an organization that would lead an effort to undermine the Bill of Rights and put the country on a path toward war with the Soviet Union. They aimed to steer voters away from Truman and then push the Dewey administration to the extreme right. Like Ben Mandel with HUAC, Isaac Don Levine was the group’s political commissar.

    In several memos, the members of this group refer to themselves as the Loeb Committee after William Loeb, the conservative publisher of the influential New Hampshire paper the Manchester Union Leader. Others in the group included the columnist Fred Woltman, later an opponent of Joseph McCarthy because he felt the Wisconsin senator was bad for the anti-Communist movement; the reporters Eugene Lyons and William Henry Chamberlin, both of whom spent years covering Moscow; Time/Life publisher Henry Luce and his wife, Claire Booth Luce; the prominent anti-Communist priest Father John Cronin; Alfred Kohlberg; and Isaac Don Levine.

    The group named itself for a skunk without apparent irony, calling itself “Operation Polecat.” This name stemmed from a comment by Governor Dewey that he would make communism “as popular as a polecat.”

    According to Kohlberg’s organizing memo, the need for the Polecats arose from Roosevelt and Truman being advised by “pro-Soviet advisers such as Alger Hiss.” The group’s manifesto stated that since “Russia is engaged in making war on the U.S.A.,” the United States must “adopt and follow a policy calculated to win this war on its present level, if possible, or based on total war if that should develop.”

    The group’s early proposals, echoing Mandel’s blaming the Democrats for harboring traitors, were partly written by Levine. They included the following:

    • “To make plain Democratic responsibility for infiltration of Communists in Government . . . Communist control of U.S. Police in State . . . take the thunder away from Truman when he finally acts . . . put him on the spot when he does not.”
    • “Lock up all Russian agents and spies, seize all Communists, organizations, records, property, etc.”
    • “Try as traitors all Americans adhering to the Soviet Union giving her aid and comfort after the day of our rupture of relations.”
    • “Extend aid only to countries that break relations with the USSR and who treat their own Communists as traitors.”
    • “Arm the anti-Communist underground forces behind the Iron Curtain.”
    • “Implement a ‘Dewey Plan’ that would create a force of ‘free world’ nations or what they called the ‘eligible world,’ . . . bring about the establishment of free governments in the ineligible world.”

    Dewey’s campaign was aware of the Polecats but did nothing to discourage them. His loss, however, finished of the Polecats as a group but not as a frightening example of how far well-connected people were willing to go (and could go) in the name of defeating liberalism, as represented in this case by the likes of Alger Hiss. Substitute the name Joe Biden for Hiss, and there are plans for fake electors, impounded voting machines, and January 6, 2020—the day in when Trump’s supporters invaded the Capitol building in a futile but bloody attempt to halt the electoral process after Trump lost his reelection bid to Joe Biden.

    The Polecats, however, weren’t the only ones to use the Hiss case to advance an antidemocratic agenda. Three weeks after the jury’s guilty verdict, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, searching for an issue that would drive his reelection campaign, traveled to Wheeling, West Virginia, to warn its Republican Women’s Club that dozens of Communists were operating with impunity in the State Department. With that, the junior senator from Wisconsin put a face and name to the era whose repressive politics were the hallmark of our democracy’s most precarious years, thanks in large part to the refusal of his party to take him on.

    Throughout the federal government, Hiss’s guilty verdict was deployed like a shillelagh against the vestiges of New Deal liberalism.

    Under pressure from Alfred Kohlberg and the China Lobby, the so-called China hands, the State Department’s great experts on Far East affairs, were let go individually for their alleged complicity in “losing” China. The loss of their expertise would have a disastrous impact on our policies in the Far East and Southeastern Asia.

    Throughout the diplomatic corps, in what was known as the Lavender Scare, gays were purged from their jobs because they were allegedly susceptible to Communist extortion.

    Over decades, Hiss’s conviction gave sustenance to the increasingly widely held notion that liberal policies as a response to Cold War tensions were not just a sign of weakness but tantamount to treason. Even after the McCarthy period lost steam, a national political candidate for either major party couldn’t win unless they demonstrated su1ciently anti-Communist credentials. In that context and to varying degrees, we have the Hiss case to thank for the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War. Lyndon B. Johnson told aides that he knew Vietnam was an unwinnable disaster. Yet he acknowledged on tape that he kept doubling down because the perception of “losing” to Communists would have been, for him and his party, an even greater disaster.

    There was hardly a segment of American politics where the Hiss case didn’t have some influence. Dwight Eisenhower emerged from World War II as a genuine and folksy war hero. His likability factor (or “Q rating” today) was sky high. No wonder his campaign slogan was “I like Ike.” The irony of appealing to voters in that way was that hardly anyone liked his running mate, Richard Nixon. Yet there he was, second on the ticket, in large part because of his role in pushing HUAC to investigate Hiss in 1948. That, in turn, set the stage for Nixon’s Senate victory over Helen Gahagan Douglas two years later. In that race, as he did with his first electoral contest against Representative Jerry Voorhis, a liberal but staunchly anti-Communist member of HUAC, Nixon falsely, but successfully, accused his opponent of ties to Communists.

    While Eisenhower would have been the favorite in the 1952 presidential contest even if there had been no Hiss case, it seems clear the GOP was seriously helped by the tarring of Democrats as soft on Communism, growing unhappiness with the war on Korea (another effort by Democrats to prove they were not soft on Communism), and Adlai Stevenson’s prior association with Hiss. The two had worked together as young lawyers in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and Stevenson subsequently testified for Hiss as a character witness. During the 1952 campaign, Nixon enjoyed twitting the Democratic presidential nominee with his “Alger, oh, I meant Adlai,” to make sure that voters connected the dots between the two.

    Stevenson was a decent man with a much better sense of humor than the average politician. Still, his liberalism seemed out of step with the more conservative politics of the period. Although there were always exceptions, Americans in the 1950s skewed toward cookie-cutter conformity out of fear of sticking out or being different. Stevenson was also called “an egghead,” not fondly when being an intellectual was grounds for suspicion.

    If Eisenhower’s victories in 1952 and 1956 can be at least partly at-tributed to a political atmosphere polluted at first by the Hiss case followed by a more general malaise of anti-Communism, then one would have to add a connecting circle for the tenure of John Foster Dulles as secretary of state.

    Although he was behind the hiring of Hiss as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dulles craftily separated himself from Hiss by testifying against him at his second trial. The point he was disputing was so arcane it made little difference except that it protected Dulles from being labeled a Hiss supporter as opposed to his predecessor, Dean Acheson, who, after the verdict, came under intense criticism for saying that he would not turn his back on Hiss.

    As a private citizen, Dulles contributed large sums to Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist group, America First. Given his prior partnerships with high-ranking Nazis, his support for authoritarian regimes as secretary of state to the benefit of American corporations and to the detriment of their victims and America’s long-term interests is no surprise. Of course, Dulles was secretary of state and not president, so while policy might have originated in his office, it was signed off on by Eisenhower and perhaps Nixon. On the other hand, Dulles has always been seen as one of the twentieth century’s most powerful secretaries of state. The following are three examples of his foreign policies that had enormous consequences.

    In Guatemala, he approved his brother Allen’s plan to remove the nationalist government headed by Jacobo Arbenz, a pro-democracy reformist. Arbenz had replaced a corrupt General and United Fruit stooge named Jorge Ubico and began cracking down on United Fruit, the country’s largest and most brutal landowner and a longtime Sullivan & Cromwell client.

    In 1953, he oversaw the US intervention in Iran and the removal of its democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, himself anti-Communist, but who nationalized the country’s oil resources, especially angering the British government and the British Petroleum Company. Mosaddegh was replaced by the handpicked Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who wasn’t even living in Iran and had little connection to the country. Both moves set dangerous precedents and had tragic results. Decades later, American support of the Shah became a complete disaster for the Carter administration when, after the Shah was flown to the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries responded by taking forty-four hostages. No doubt, both actions contributed to suspicions about US intentions in the region that have only continued to grow.

    Under the Geneva Convention, Vietnam was scheduled to have free elections in 1956. The United States was concerned, however, because the most likely outcome would have been the country agreeing to unification under the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, who most likely would have won some 80 percent of the vote. Even though the United States had promised not to use force or the threat of force to “disturb” the free elections, it set up the government of “South Vietnam” under Ngo Dinh Diem and supported that government when it refused to hold the elections. The move led directly to the Vietnam War.

    The lessons of Guatemala, Vietnam, and Iran are too often forgotten today. As this is being written, civil liberties are again in peril, much as in the 1950s when protecting academic freedom frequently felt like a losing battle and when concepts such as patriotism and Americanism were co-opted by those whose actions showed they believed in neither.

    Just as it was in 1938 and 1948, liberalism is in the crosshairs of the far right, and just as then, the results could again devastate if conservatives succeed. With climate change and nuclear proliferation high on the world’s agenda, the stakes might be even higher than they were then, even when groups such as the America First Committee placed our participation in World War II, “the Good War,” in doubt. Only President Roosevelt’s political skill was the difference in achieving Lend-Lease, legislation that was vital to supplying England with the weaponry it needed to stave off the Germans until the United States could enter the war. Imagine life in America today had our fate in 1941 been placed in the hands of a leader without FDR’s skill or vision.

    All these historical markers make it imperative that we pay attention to the lessons of the Hiss case and the tragic political consequences that can result, even from the wrongful prosecution of a single individual.

    The Great Fear, indeed.

    Although this book has been completed, my work on the case is not done. There are more documents to read and more pieces to fill in the puzzle. I continue to read new claims that fresh evidence proves Hiss was a spy. They fall apart on examination in every instance, but they still need to be investigated.

    My belief that Hiss was not a spy was an easy call, confirmed by years of careful research into the government and defense files and the simple, straightforward logic that too often has been absent from writing on the Hiss case. Leftists commit political crimes. Alger just wasn’t one of them.

    And while those who will continue to claim that Alger was guilty will undoubtedly deride my qualifications and conclusions as well as my alternative theories of how the evidence against him was gathered, I challenge them to present a more reasonable theory based solely on the facts and to answer the very same questions that I have posed.

    I was watching MSNBC one day in 2017 when David Cay Johnston sat down for an interview. He was talking about Donald Trump’s latest about-face on Russia. He said that while investigating a possible crime, detectives not only look for means, motive, and opportunity but also say the simplest story is the true one; the tale that changes repeatedly is the one that should raise suspicion. In the Hiss case, it was Hiss’s story that remained steady, while Chambers’s version carried more amendments than the Constitution.

    None of Alger’s actions before or after the conviction resembled those of a guilty man. If he had committed the crime, he would have had to have been extraordinarily reckless and, frankly, lacking in basic intelligence. He was neither, and no evidence suggests otherwise.

    I am often asked, “Why Hiss if he was innocent?” While it would be easy to say that Alger was in the wrong place at the wrong time, the truth is that his decency as a friend and as an idealistic New Dealer jump-started the conspiracy. His faith in the American judicial system (however misguided) gave those who meant him harm no choice but to finish it.

    I’m also often asked, “Why would Chambers give up a job and a quiet, peaceful life to lie about someone else if that’s what you think he did?”

    I’ve thought a lot about that. When I was finally satisfied with an answer, it didn’t seem that diffi1cult. First, correspondence shows Chambers was leaving Time before the Hiss case broke. There’s no question about that. Still, I’ve come to believe he was a reluctant participant in the plot against Hiss. I think he was manipulated to do what he did, not that his actions were always blame-free. He destroyed the lives of people who deserved only praise for what they did. He pushed this phony idea that you couldn’t be a person of the left and a patriot at the same time.

    I’m not a psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker. I’m in no position to diagnose anyone, but as an observer of people and their actions, I believe a sympathetic person can make judgments without formal training. In this case, Whittaker Chambers was not a well man psychologically. Thanks in part to a brutal home life as a young boy, and to societal pressures that led him to believe he should only feel shame about his sexuality, he had no self-esteem, and his natural tendency toward paranoia took root. In later years, it manifested itself in a variety of ways, whether it was thinking that people who had no such intention were out to do him harm and that he needed to act first before he was victimized, a feeling that cost too many people the happiness and success they so deserved. Though he was comfortable financially, he had a compulsion to borrow and steal money, and it was that—not the fear of reprisal from his spy bosses (if he had any)—that caused him to flee the Communist Party.

    As for his sexuality, it is my guess that the years he felt he could freely pursue his desires were too few. Outside of that milieu, he saw himself as a “pervert,” terrified that his secret would be used to destroy his life. When he lived in Greenwich Village as a young man in his late twenties and early thirties, sharing a house with Michael Intrator, Grace Lumpkin, and Esther Shemitz, I think he was at his happiest, indulging what he called his “uncontrollable urges.” I wonder how this country would be a differen place had the four of them openly coupled up the way their friends all believed they did.

    I believe he was ultimately manipulated into acting against Hiss by people with a fiercer determination than his. Isaac Don Levine and Ben Mandel were only two of many. Richard Nixon, J. Edgar Hoover, and others all had a hand in bending Chambers to their will. Esther Chambers was a person of enormous physical courage when she was younger. Still, loyalty to a spouse is not a good enough excuse to explain lying, thievery, or destroying another life for no good reason whatsoever.

    As for Priscilla Hiss, who I know was not the easiest person to be around, like Whittaker Chambers, she was born before her time; she was intelligent, talented, well-read, and a terrific teacher and editor. From all accounts, she could also be bitter about her life, and that bitterness was left to her sons to absorb. It wasn’t easy for any of them, but when I visit Tony’s apartment and see his wonderful family and when I see him among friends who adore him, it warms me to know that life can be lived happily even by those who face challenges not of their own making. I hope the same for the Chambers family.

    As I write this, I am sixty-eight years old. Once, I was the kid on the research team, running nearly three-hour marathons in my spare time. At sixty-eight, I have a pair of heart attacks, six stents, and a minor stroke on my health résumé. I am also one of a fast-shrinking pool of Americans who even remember who Alger Hiss was. I doubt there will be anyone to take up my work when time forces me to set it aside for good.

    Decades ago, in the NECLC office, I absorbed the stories of our visitors, for whom the Great Depression, the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War were the most critical years of their lives. Many of them personally felt the profound impact of the McCarthy era in the wake of Alger’s conviction. Their willingness to share the stories of their hardships, because they believed in society’s potential, has had a profound impact on my outlook.

    The men represented a spectrum of largely progressive views, from moderately liberal to current Communist Party membership. Still, all were there because they respected Alger, what he had overcome, and what he was doing to clear his name.

    Sitting there, listening to their stories, made me proud to be part of that group. After decades of research into the charges against him, I am even more so today. Despite losing his career and freedom, Alger Hiss never lost faith in the American justice system. In that sense, the case was also about a single man whose life was upended because of false charges against him, and while I can’t reasonably expect anyone to spend forty years redressing a wrong, having empathy for a victim of any injustice makes us better human beings and is just one more reason why the case still matters.

    But there is also this: even in a democracy of more than three hundred million people, a determined, well-placed group of ten or five, or even one person, can exercise a shocking amount of control over the country, with disastrous consequences for the entire world. Maybe that’s the ultimate lesson of Hiss’s case and of Alger Hiss, who remains the heroic canary in the coal mine. He is warning us, for as long as people remember his name, that if we don’t understand what happened, then the next time could be worse.